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INTRODUCTION
T he Medicare program currently accounts for more than $200 billion in federal expenditures every year, and is projected to exceed Social Security in the next few decades. State-level annual Medicare transfers, defined as federal expenditures less federal taxes (or the balance of payments, as in Leonard, Walder, and Acevedo (1999) ), vary widely for the Medicare program, varying from $421 in annual net benefits per resident of Florida to -$248 per resident of Minnesota and -$297 per resident in Wyoming. Does this mean that Medicare is intrinsically unfair to some states while showering other states with resources? Unfortunately, these annual flows cannot inform about the fairness of the Medicare program. Florida would be expected to receive more in Medicare expenditures simply because there are so many more elderly people there receiving benefits compared to the younger working population paying into the system. People in Florida may also be sicker, or the per-unit costs of health care in such states may be higher. Finally, income-related transfers across states should not be surprising, since the Medicare program is designed to transfer resources from highincome taxpayers towards lower-income taxpayers who pay less in taxes but still receive the same Medicare benefits.
In this paper, we attempt to learn more about these implicit state-level transfers under the Medicare program. As a first step, we separate state-level average taxes paid into the Medicare program from average expenditures per recipient; this in part controls for the differences in the age composition of Florida and younger states. While variation in average taxes is largely the consequence of differences in state-level median income, the variation in Medicare expenditures cannot be explained so easily. By contrast, there is little variation in average statelevel Social Security taxes and benefits, aside from what is explained by differences across states in their income levels.
To move beyond annual Medicare flows to the more appropriate lifetime transfers under the Medicare system, we calculate lifetime taxes paid into the Medicare program, either on a historical basis or a projected basis, for current workers. We also calculate historical and anticipated lifetime Medicare benefits for retirees and for current workers. Of course, workers living in Michigan (for example) may expect to retire and receive Florida's benefits, and many Floridians have spent most of their working lives in other states. We adjust for these migration patterns by using the first three digits of the Medicare enrollee's Social Security number, which identifies the state in which the enrollee (or spouse) first become covered by Social Security.
We used a variety of data sources to construct lifetime measures of state-level taxes paid into Medicare and anticipated benefits; the Continuous Medicare History Survey, the TAXSIM program at the National Bureau of Economic Research, merged with the Current Population Survey, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Briefly, we find that, on a lifetime basis, there are very large transfers across states effected by the Medicare program. Overall, given continued growth in the Medicare program, households can expect to receive on net $17,386 more in benefits than what they have paid, or will pay, into the Medicare program. But these transfers vary widely across states, ranging from $51,798 in Louisiana, $28, 849 in Florida, and $25, 671 in Massachusetts, 891 in Oregon, 065 in Minnesota, 565 in Hawaii. These transfers are correlated negatively with state-level median income, but the correlation is relatively weak. Some part of this variation can be explained by disease burdens and differences in the price of health care, but even adjusting for these factors leaves federally-funded transfers of as much as $40 thousand across states with similar income levels.
This perplexing pattern of Medicare spending across areas such as states has been noted in the health care research since the pioneering work by Glover in the 1930s and by Wennberg and his collaborators since the 1970s (e.g., see Wennberg and Gittlesohn, 1982; Cooper, 1999) . The notion of "small area variation" was of interest to health care practitioners because it suggested that there was no single scientific standard of health care, and immediately raised the question of whether the low-intensity regions were "too low" or the highintensity regions were "too high." The small area variation literature also captured the attention of health economists in the 1970s and 1980s, who tried to interpret these variations through the lens of the supplier-induced demand hypothesis.
1 Our contribution here is to note that, as the Medicare program (and health care spending generally) has grown to roughly three-quarters the size of Social Security, so also has the magnitude of the annual and lifetime state transfers. This growth in size of the transfers has attracted the attention of state officials, such as those in Minnesota who recently sued the federal government "for unfairly discriminating against some seniors because of where they live" (Shapinsky, 1999) . How should one interpret the welfare implications of such transfers? If the more intensive levels of health care generate better survival rates or satisfied consumers, then these differences raise issues of equity, since they could be exacerbating the exiting level of health inequality in the population. Conversely, if the higher levels of spending provide little or nothing in health benefits, residents of states with positive transfers from Medicare would not necessarily be better off. In the next section, we briefly consider these theoretical issues in the context of a simple model with two states.
WELARE IMPLICATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL MEDICARE TRANSFERS
The normative implications of Medicare spending across regions can be considered in the context of a simple model with two states: State L has low levels of real per capita Medicare spending (adjusted for the age composition of the population), while State H experiences high levels of per Medicare spending. In the first scenario, shown in Figure  1 , both states have an equal burden of disease, but because State H's health providers provide better (and more expensive) care for their residents, qualityadjusted lifespan is higher, with the "production function" of health shown by the curve AA'.
The line AC represents the shadow cost or opportunity cost of health care spending on other health care services, perhaps in the non-Medicare population, such as prenatal screening, pharmaceutical assistance, and so forth.
2 As drawn, there are A value of $100,000 per quality-adjusted life year is sometimes used as the appropriate cutoff point; using this parameter would imply that the slope of the line AC would be 1/100,000.
incremental health benefits of the additional Medicare spending in State H, but the benefits fall short of the opportunity cost or the value of the money in other uses. (This is just the way it is drawn; there could also be net benefits from the additional Medicare spending if, for example, A' were above C.) In this case, there are two effects of the incremental Medicare spending. The first is that the higher level of spending induces a welfare loss of CA' in terms of health (or CA' times the inverse of the slope of AC in terms of dollars), because at the margin, the higher expenditures do not meet the cost-benefit test; in other words the money could have been better used elsewhere. (Assume that there are no gains from reducing spending below that in State L.) There is also an increase in inequality between states along the dimension of health, at least among the elderly population.
3 A full-scale analysis would presumably include the distributional consequences of what would have happened in the absence of State H's extra spending, whether the money would be rebated to consumers or spent on alternative health programs.
Alternatively, State L could be one in which the health care "production function" is described by AA', while State H is one in which citizens are sicker, so their production function is described by BB'. If this were true, then the additional spending would be productive in terms of improving survival (even if not meeting the cost-benefit test), and reduce health inequality by bringing the underlying health status in the two states to equality at H 0 .
Finally, the marginal benefits of Medicare spending could yield no additional benefits, in which case the productivity curve would be given by the dotted line AB'. If so, it might appear as if the equity issues vanish, since residents in State H don't benefit at all from the additional health care spending; the incremental spending is simply waste. In this case, the welfare cost would be equal to the difference in the expenditures between the high and low states (again assuming that the low expenditure state is an efficient level of spending).
There are still equity issues involved, however. First, Medicare enrollees with managed care providers get much better benefits (such as drug benefits or Part B premium supplements) in regions where fee-for-service Medicare expenditures are high. The reason is that the per capita payment made by Medicare to the managed care company on behalf of the enrollee is tied to average fee-for-service expenditures in the county. 4 Managed care companies in low-expenditure areas such as Minnesota, with reimbursement rates roughly half of those in high-expenditure areas, are unable to offer these additional benefits, precipitating the lawsuit noted above.
Second, providers are likely to enjoy some of the benefits of the higher per capita expenditures, given the existence of an upward sloping supply curve with regard to physician migration. And third, there are intergenerational equity issues to the extent that younger taxpayers are paying for the higher levels of expenditures in some regions. We next consider empirical issues in the measurement of cross-state Medicare flows, and in the final section return to consider these efficiency and equity issues.
CROSS-STATE TRANSFERS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT
We begin the empirical analysis by considering state-level annual transfers for the Medicare program in the spirit of Leonard, Walder, and Acevedo (1999) who developed state balance of payment measures for all federal spending. At this aggregate level, we begin with total Medicare expenditures, which include retirement benefits as well as supplemental benefits for people under 65 who qualify under disability or survivorship provisions.
Medicare revenues come from three sources. Like Social Security, Medicare hospital insurance is funded through a payroll tax. Unlike Social Security, however, there is no limit on earnings subject to tax. Both the employer and employee pay 1.45 percent of earnings, for a total of 2.9 percent of all earnings (self-employed pay the entire 2.9 percent). Second, enrollees in the Part B program pay premiums, which in 1996 were $510 annually per person. We assume that each elderly enrollee pays the premium, although in fact the premium is paid by Medicaid for those eligible, and a small percentage do not enroll in the Part B plan at all (Fisher et al., 1990) . 5 The remainder of aggregate Medicare payments are assumed to come from general income tax revenues. 6 We exclude Alaska and Washington D.C. from our analysis because of the small samples of both taxpayers and Medicare recipients. Figure 2 shows the difference between Medicare expenditures and Medicare taxes, where a positive number means that the state receives more in expenditures than it pays in taxes. Transfers are expressed in per capita terms per household, and expressed (on the horizontal axis) as a function of the median household income for the state in 1996. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 We can control crudely for age differences across states by considering separately average Medicare taxes paid by taxpayer under the age of 65, and average expenditures for each recipient. We would also like to provide a benchmark-Social Security-against which to compare the pattern of income-based transfers across states. In general, we would expect to find Medicare exhibiting more redistribution from high income to low income states. For Social Security, higher income recipi-5 Strictly speaking, the Part B premiums are not taxes since they are voluntary; the enrollee can always opt out and not accept Part B physician coverage. In fact, nearly every elderly person is enrolled in the Part B coverage since the Part B premium accounts for just one-quarter of its actuarial cost; the remaining three-quarters is covered by federal tax payments. 6 We need roughly 14 percent of federal income tax liability to fund total Medicare expenditures, assuming that Medicare Part B is financed entirely out of the personal income tax. While somewhat arbitrary, it avoids the thorny problem of having to allocate corporate tax payments (for example) to individual households. Below, when we focus just on Medicare for people over age 65, we need a much smaller fraction of federal income taxes. Annual state-level data comes from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (1997) and the Health Care Financing Administration 1998 Data Compendium. 7 See Skinner (1997, 1999) who argue that in fact, there is very little in terms of dollars that are distributed across income groups on a lifetime basis.
ents receive more in monthly benefits, while Medicare coverage is presumably the same for all income groups. Furthermore, Social Security is funded through a proportional payroll tax with a cap, while three-quarters of the Part B payments, for example, are funded through progressive general tax revenues. Social Security benefits per retired worker and taxes per current worker are shown in Figure 3a , arrayed by 1996 household median income along the horizontal scale. The bottom set of squares gives OASDI taxes per covered worker, while the top set of diamonds measures Social Security benefits per retired worker.
Variations across state in average taxes are largely explained by median household income (the correlation coefficient ρ = 0.79, p < .001) as are variations in average benefits (ρ = 0.64, p < .001). Figure 3b shows taxes and expenditures for the Medicare program. The bottom series, shown as squares, measure average taxes paid per taxpaying unit. These are again closely correlated with median state income (ρ = 0.77, p < .001), with an implied tax elasticity of about one. Average Medicare expenditures, however, show a different pattern, with a small but insignificant correlation between spending and average state level income (ρ = (Wennberg and Cooper, 1999 ).
As noted above, however, there are serious limitations to analyzing a lifetime program such as Medicare or Social Security on an annual basis (e.g., Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass, 1999) . For this reason, we consider the Medicare program on a lifetime basis, accounting for the fact that even people who are today just paying taxes into Medicare can expect to receive something of value in the future.
MEDICARE TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES ON A LIFETIME BASIS
Here we move away from the annual perspective to consider a "balanced budget" analysis of the Medicare program, accounting for both taxes paid into the program since 1966 and anticipated future benefits even for those working. Thus we must make important assumptions about future growth rates in taxes and health care costs.
Lifetime Medicare Taxes
To determine lifetime taxes, we begin with the cross-sectional 1993 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data on family taxable income and "age" the PSID data from 1993 to 1995, our benchmark year, by assuming income and earnings grew at the rate of inflation. Households were excluded if the head was under the age of 25 or over the age of 89, or if total money income was negative. We then merge the panel of labor income (or taxable income, or just income, depending on the year of the survey) from the individual-level questionnaire for the head and spouse back to 1967, when the PSID began collecting data on income. Assuming that this earnings/taxable income measure from the individual panel is equivalent to income taxable under Social Security rules, we can calculate the present value of total payroll taxes paid by the head and spouse of a given household as:
where P is the present value of payroll taxes, J = 1 for single households and J = 2 for married or cohabiting households, N is the year of retirement (assumed to be age 65), E ij is taxable earnings for person j in year i, MAX i is the cap on Medicare contributions in year i (currently MAX = ∞), t i the tax rate in year i, and R i is the discounting factor. We suppress the individual-level subscript for legibility.
The discount rate is set at a constant real rate of return equal to r for accumulation up to 1995, so that for i < 1995,
1995-i . For future tax payments, however, we discount at the rate of r plus π, where π is the probability of dying; for simplicity we assume a constant mortality risk of 0.005 up to age 65, where the individual is assumed to retire. Thus
Clearly, assumptions must be made about the tax rules and future earnings as well. We assume that the Medicare pay-roll tax base will continue with the circa 1995 rules in place. Earnings are projected to grow at the rate g (augmented by one percentage point up until age 40 to account for earnings growth because of experience).
Estimating future Part B premiums is straightforward; the present value of such benefits is simply:
Here the Part B premiums are paid only at ages past 65, thus when the individual is over age 65 or more, φ i = 1, otherwise it is zero. We assume that the premium also grows over time at the rate g. The benchmark premium W 1995 is the $553 annual payment in 1995. The discounting factor R i b is more complicated, since for older ages the discounting because of mortality is particularly important. We use 5-year age-and sex-specific lifetable data for the years 1989-91 from Wilmoth (2000) , where Π a(1995) is the conditional probability of surviving from one's age in 1995 (a(1995) ) to one's age in year i, a(i). The discount rate is therefore written:
where g is the growth rate for Part B premiums, and r is the discount rate as before. 9 We assume that the growth rate in Medicare premiums is the same as the growth rate in Medicare spending. This may be a conservative estimate, given the projected growth in Part B premiums (Moon and Kuntz, 1996) . Finally, to measure past and future federal income tax payments, we calculate combined earnings of the head (or the head and spouse) in years stretching back to 1967, and use this measure of income to predict federal tax payments made in those years using the historical data from the TAXSIM database.
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The current value of accumulated plus future income taxes is therefore:
where T y is the current value of income taxes paid, F i (.,.) is the federal tax function in year i as calculated in the TAXSIM program, α i is the share of federal tax payments in year i attributed to the Medicare Part B program (from aggregate data on federal individual income tax payments and Part B expenditures), and R i y is the income-tax based discounting factor. This is similar to the discounting factor used in the payroll tax equation.
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We cannot predict what the income tax F i (.,.) will be in the future. Rather than make assumptions about income tax functions, we make a simple assumption about future income taxes paid-that they will be equal to the taxes paid in 1995, augmented by (i) an age-related growth in future income tax payments of 1.0 percentage point annually up to age 65, and a decline of 2.2 percent after age 65, 12 and (ii) a growth in general tax revenue devoted to Medicare that corresponds to the growth rate g in Medicare expenditures. This growth can take the form either of 9 A further complication is when we accumulate payments for someone who is over 65; the historical growth in Part B premiums since 1990 has been a little less than 5 percent in real terms; we use this accumulation rate for the older members of the sample. 10 We assume that if the household head is between the ages of 30 and 50, they have two deductions for children.
Otherwise they are provided with the standard deduction. 11 Because income tax payments are assumed to continue past age 65, but payroll taxes are not, we must further discount these future income tax payments for mortality risk, which is 4.6 percentage points on average past age 65. 12 These are based on cross-sectional regressions from the 1993 data.
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13 Finally, combined lifetime Medicare payments, T, is the sum of all three revenue sources,
The PSID sample comprised 7,475 households. A real interest rate of r = .03, a growth rate in real per capita Medicare expenditures of 0.02, and a real growth in income of .01 were assumed in the baseline calculations. To further assign Medicare tax measures by state, we calculate average lifetime Medicare taxes by 21 separate "cells:" seven categories on the basis of taxable income (less than $10,000, $10-20,000, $20-35,000, $35-50,000, $50-75,000, $75-100,000, and $100,000+) and three on age (less than 40, 40-64, and 65+). The age categories for those less than age 40 and those between 40 and 64 were done on the basis of the matched CPS data; we know from the tax returns in TAXSIM whether the head or spouse were age 65 or over. Our assumption is that the lifetime taxes paid into the Medicare program within a given age and income group will be the same whether the age/income group is in Louisiana or in Connecticut.
The TAXSIM sample of roughly 100,000 taxpayers with IRS-provided state identifiers allows for an accurate measure of federal taxes paid because it implicitly adjusts for differences across states in the reporting of adjusted gross income (AGI) and hence in federal tax payments (see Clotfelter and Feenberg, 1988 ).
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The lifetime tax cells (from the PSID) were then matched with state-level taxable income categories and age categories from TAXSIM and the CPS to build up average (and anticipated) tax payments into the Medicare program for each state.
As noted above, we restricted our attention to three age groups; those with household heads under age 40 (average lifetime taxes equal to $55,056), heads between 40 and 65 (lifetime taxes of $74,987) and those 65 and over (lifetime taxes of $57,577). Average lifetime tax payments are shown in Table 1 for selected states and in Table A .1 for all states. The average tax paid per household (including future anticipated taxes) is $63,813 averaged across all states in our sample. These measures are not very sensitive to the assumed interest rate used to accumulate or discount tax payments. The reason is that when the interest rate is higher, past contributions are larger but future contributions are discounted more heavily, so overall taxes do not vary by much.
Lifetime Medicare Expenditures
We use the five percent Continuous Medical History Survey sample of Medicare expenditures to calculate expenditures in 1995 by age category (in five year increments from age 65 to age 90), and by sex, for combined Part A plus Part B expenditures. Medicare spending is assigned to the state of residence. Thus if a Medicare patient living in Vermont seeks care in Massachusetts, the resulting expenditures are assigned back to Vermont (see Wennberg and Cooper (1999) for a discussion of these issues). We calculate each state-level Medicare adjustment factor as the ratio of the (age-and sex-ad- 13 We assume that if there are two people in the household, that they remain married in past (and in future)
years. Equivalently, we assume that if the couple were separated (or will separate in the future), that they remarry and their spouses will be of similar age and earnings capacity. However, the extent of this error for taxes paid across states is not likely to be large, since we are averaging across individuals within a state. We are likely missing some federal tax payments in the past because we don't have accurate individual asset income in prior years. 14 State identifiers are not provided for taxpayers with AGI over $200,000. We allocate those taxpayers to states in proportion to the aggregate numbers of such taxpayers (by state) given in the Statistics of Income Bulletin (Spring 1997, vol 16 no 4 where a(i,j) is the age for individual j in year i, and M ns = 0 for a(i,j) < 65. We use the same discount factors as in the Part B premium-in other words, the discount rates reflect mortality probabilities, the discount rate, and anticipated future growth rates in Medicare expenditures. One crucial assumption here is that the relative differences in state-level Medicare spending will remain constant over the individuals' lifetime. At least during the 1990s, however, the assumed 1995 statelevel Medicare expenditure differentials appear to be conservative; the (unadjusted) ratio of Medicare expenditures per enrollee in Florida versus Minnesota was 1.64 in 1989, 1.51 in 1995, and 1.50 in 1998; equivalent ratios for Louisiana versus Minnesota were 1.77, 1.58, and 1.66.
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On the other hand, state-level spending patterns hide many of the more pronounced regional patterns in health care spending; as noted above, some regions of Florida are half again as high as other regions in Florida.
Average expected Medicare benefits (before adjusting for migration) are $65,213 for the household head and spouse (if present) when the head's age is under 40, $89,244 for households aged 40-64, and $96, 280 for households with heads age 65+. The present value of benefits is highest for the older households because the discount rate is higher than the assumed growth in Medicare expenditures. 16 These estimates have a very large confidence interval surrounding them. As experience has taught, long-term projections of any social insurance program are speculative at best (White, 1999; Lee and Skinner, 1999) .
Comparing average expenditures and average taxes by our three age groups implies that, at the projected growth rates, even the youngest age groups can expect to receive more in Medicare benefits than in taxes. For the age 40 and under group, the net benefit (simply the present value (PV) of expenditures less taxes) is $10,157 (or $1.18 per dollar of taxes paid), for the age 40-65 group, net benefits are $14,357 ($1.19 per dollar paid). The net benefits are largest for those age 65 and over; $38,703, or $1.67 in benefits per dollar in accumulated taxes. Clearly, the elderly population has gained more from Medicare, since they paid taxes into the program for a shorter period of time, and at considerably lower tax rates, than their children or grandchildren (see Auerbach, Gohkale, and Kotlikoff, 1992) . But, the predicted net benefits depend crucially on the assumed growth rate for the Medicare program. With a growth rate of 0.5 percent instead of 2 percent, the implied lifetime transfers are -$15,900, -$7246, and $26,012 for the youngest, middle, and oldest age groups. 15 Interestingly, these same ratios in 1985 were just 1.29 and 1.11, suggesting that the fundamental change in spending occurred between 1985 and 1989. These data are overall Medicare expenditures per enrollee, drawn from the Statistical Abstract of the United States in various years, and thus are not strictly comparable to the age-and sex-adjusted Medicare claims data we use below. 16 Recall that for individuals older than age 65, we accumulate their prior Medicare spending.
National
Migration
We would like to account for the fact that people may work in one state and retire in another. Thus someone currently working in Minnesota may ultimately retire in Miami, and thus receive considerably higher benefits than would be suggested by simply assigning to them the future Minnesota benefits. To address this issue, we use a unique characteristic of Social Security identifying numbers: the first three digits identify the state in which the Social Security number was assigned prior to 1972.
17 For our cohort of Medicare recipients, Social Security numbers were needed only when they started working in a sector covered by Social Security; thus most would have procured their number during their working career.
To estimate benefits for current workers in a given state, we calculate for age category a, V′ ma , the average expected Medicare benefits for people who currently live and work in state m:
where n mj is the number of people who got their card in state m but later moved to state j, and N m is the total number of people who got their card in state m. By the same token, taxes paid into Medicare by people who are over age 65 and living in state j, but who got their Social Security number in state m, is given by:
We are making two important assumptions here. The first is that the average income of people who moved from a state is equal to the average income of people who remained. We assign lifetime taxes of a representative current Michigan (over age 65) individual to be the lifetime taxes of an over 65 individual living in Florida who moved from Michigan. If migration is associated with above-average or below-average income, our results could be biased. Second, we make steady-state assumptions about migration patterns; that those who are working today will migrate according to the same patterns their parents followed. These specific migration patterns may change for the baby boomers, but the general southerly migration of retirees towards warmer weather is likely to continue in the future.
STATE-LEVEL MEDICARE BENEFITS AND TAXES: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Medicare benefits, taxes, and transfers, adjusted for migration, are shown for selected states in Table 1 and for all states in Appendix A.1; transfers are shown in Figure 1 by state. On average, there are positive gains to the Medicare program; given anticipated growth in the program, all current generations can anticipate benefiting from the program in dollar terms. However, there is considerable variation in the magnitude of the transfers, with a few states being net losers Hawaii loses the most (-$19,565), followed by Oregon, Minnesota, and Washington. Given the assumed growth rate in the Medicare program, most states end up receiving net gains, but there is considerable variation in the pattern of transfers controlling for median income. For example, the net lifetime gain in North Dakota is $6,928, while the net gain in Louisiana is $51,798. Yet the two states have virtually identical median income ($30,209 and $29,518, respectively) . In terms of Medicare benefits per dollar of tax payment, current residents of Oregon can expect to receive $0.84 per dollar, while residents of Louisiana can expect to receive $1.93 in future benefits per dollar of revenue paid (See Appendix A.1). The cross-state variation in Medicare benefits is in many cases larger than the inter-generational transfers that have previously captured the attention of economists (e.g., Auerbach, Gohkale, and Kotlikoff, 1992) .
Flows of Medicare transfers may be the consequence simply of differences in the price of health care across regions, or because of differences in the underlying levels of health. Such transfers can be justified where the federal government is pooling health (or price) risk across states. Thus we correct for any differences that may be the consequence of health or price factors. First, we correct for differences in the cost of health care across states using the Dartmouth Atlas price index, which in turn is based on the price index used by Medicare to adjust their Part B payments to physicians. 18 We then consider a number of factors that could explain some part of the Medicare transfers across states. One possibility is the mortality rate in each state; since the last six months of life is typically associated with high levels of Medicare 18 The Dartmouth Atlas price index is by hospital service area, of which there are approximately 3500 in the United States (see Wennberg and Cooper, 1999) . These were matched to state borders with a crosswalk program at the zip code level. expenditures, states with higher mortality rates might be expected to experience higher per capita expenditures. However, even when Medicare expenditures was adjusted by measuring Medicare spending separately for those who died and those who survived to the next year, and then normalizing mortality rates (the percent who died) by age-and sex-category to the national averages, the same patterns persisted. Indeed, there is often more variation in how patients are treated in their last six months of life; for example average Medicare expenditures were $6,315 for elderly women age 85-89 in Minnesota, but $19,931 for the same group in Louisiana (also see Wennberg and Cooper, 1999) . A different approach is to use statelevel measures of the disease burden to explain lifetime Medicare transfers. We construct an index that consists of the average proportional deviation of five diseases that are important (and costly) among the elderly, and are further considered "index" admissions in that nearly every person with this disease will be admitted to a hospital: rates per thousand of heart attacks (Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI)), stroke, colon cancer, gastrointestinal bleeding, and hip fractures. This proportional index ranges from 0.79 (in Hawaii) to 1.19 (in West Virginia); see Appendix A.1 for a full listing. We apply this index proportionately to all Medicare expenditures, so we are implicitly assuming that if these "low variation" conditions are 19 percent above average, as in West Virginia, that health-related medical spending in West Virginia should be 19 percent higher among all diseases. For example, annual (1995) Medicare spending in West Virginia is adjusted downward from $4,543 (price-adjusted) to $3,818 (illness and price adjusted), while Hawaii is adjusted upward from $2,661 to $3,331.
19 Figure 5 shows the readjusted lifetime transfers where we use illness and priceadjusted Medicare spending to calculate lifetime benefits and we include real median household income on the horizontal axis. 20 The patterns are somewhat attenuated but with very similar patterns (see Table 1 and Appendix A.1). Once again, the pattern of price-and illness-adjusted lifetime transfers are highly variable, with differences of nearly $40 thousand in annual spending remaining between Texas and Oregon, states with nearly identical median real income levels.
Real median household income matters in explaining variation in lifetime Medicare transfers, but it exerts a surprisingly small effect; the regression analysis implies that transfers should decline by less than $5 thousand when moving between the 25 th and the 75 th percentile of statelevel income (or the interquartile range). These differences would be even smaller (as in McClellan and Skinner, 1997) were we able to adjust for the fact that residents of states with more illness (and lower income) are less likely to survive as long, and hence are less likely to receive as much over their lifetime in Medicare benefits.
CONCLUSION
We have found that the Medicare program effects large cross-state transfers. We sought to explain these flows on the basis of underlying health status, average levels of income, costs of health care, or the age distribution of the elderly population. However, large unexplained variations remain in these cross-state flows that cannot be explained by median income, price levels, or illness.
These differences in expenditures by state are unique among federal programs. It is certainly true that the federal tax and expenditure system transfers resources from some states to others; this is because states with higher levels of household income tend to pay more into federal programs than what they get back (e.g., Social Security). Other federal spending programs may benefit states disproportionately by the location of military bases or natural parks, but what is produced in each state (national defense, vacation destinations) tends to generate some benefit for citizens of other states.
What then can explain such dramatic differences in Medicare expenditures across states? Based on previous research, we suspect that much of the difference can be explained simply by the practice patterns (or "intensity") of health care in different states. And there is increasing evidence that for many intensive forms of medical care, the benefits are small (e.g., McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse, 1994; Conners et al., 1996) . Chau, Fisher, and Skinner (1999) find no evidence that more Medicare spending leads to improved outcomes among a nearly 100 percent sample of hip fracture patients in the Medicare population between 1993-5.
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21 Hip fracture patients, like those with heart attacks (AMI) make a good "index admission" for a study population because nearly every person with a hip fracture is admitted to the hospital. In that study, the concern was not so much the treatment during the first week or so following the hip fracture, but on subsequent treatment patterns for this elderly and quite frail population. Some evidence suggests even a negative impact of health care expenditures on outcomes at the margin owing to complications and hospital-based infections associated with the health care itself (Fisher et al., 2000) . Nor does the process of care, in the sense of measurable quality, appear to be better in high-expenditure regions. The Dartmouth Atlas quality of care index, which accounts for a variety of indicators such as annual screening for mammography, immunization for pneumonia, and annual eye exams for diabetes patients, shows no correlation with overall Medicare expenditures across large regions (Wennberg and Cooper, 1999) . It could also be that health care expenditures are so high in some regions simply because people prefer more intensive health care. A recent study of preferences for end-of-life treatment, however, showed no correlation between treatment patterns and preferences. Instead the intensity of care near death was determined almost entirely by hospital capacity in the region (Pritchard, et al., 1998) . And even if preferences explained regional variations, it is an open question why a federal program should be accommodating these preferences at no cost to the beneficiaries.
We return to our theoretical model to consider the welfare implications of these state-level transfers. We found a correlation between the level of health care expenditures and the underlying disease burden of each state; Louisiana spends more on health care and is sicker than other states. At first blush, it might appear that Medicare is therefore reducing the (state-level) inequality in health outcomes. However, differences in Medicare spending do not appear to yield net gains in health benefits; health care productivity is "flat of the curve" at least in explaining health care differences across states (e.g., AB' in Figure 1 ). Thus the differences in spending across states are suggestive of inefficiency. Equity issues arise, as mentioned above, because of the extra benefits for managed care enrollees in high-cost regions, as well as producer rents that may be enjoyed by health care providers.
There are a number of limitations to our study. One is that we do not account for the fact that people from higher income states tend to live longer and account for more Medicare spending when they are alive. As well, we do not provide a utility-based valuation of the Medicare program. McClellan and Skinner (1999) argue that dollar flows from social insurance programs such as Medicare reveal an incomplete picture of their true incidence because they do not price the insurance value of the program, either as an annuity or as health insurance.
The primary purpose of this paper has been to quantify the lifetime transfers across regions that occur through the Medicare program. The harder question is whether (and how) to reduce these variations. Lowering reimbursement rates for specific procedures could perversely induce more of those procedures in the aggregate, and punish physicians who are already conservative in their treatment decisions. The Breaux-Thomas Medicare reform proposal, in which recipients would have been given a voucher for use in purchasing health insurance, would have confronted these cross-state equity issues had the voucher's value been set at the national level. These issues are not likely to go away as redistribution through the Medicare program continues to grow.
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